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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT 
ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Stephany Griffith-Jones
∗ and José Antonio Ocampo
∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This working paper has been commissioned by the Poverty Group, Bureau for Development 
Policy at UNDP, to identify the transmission mechanisms of the financial crisis from developed 
to developing countries and to provide broad policy recommendations at the national, global 
and regional level. The paper identifies three mechanisms that play a key role in spreading the 
consequences of the financial crisis to the developing world: remittances, capital flows and 
trade. The policy responses take MDG achievement and poverty reduction as the central policy 
concern. The paper indicates that a fair number of countries have policy space to protect 
vulnerable groups in the short run as well as to undertake investments to build resilience and 
reach these goals in the longer term. Other countries will need additional development 
assistance to protect development achievements. The authors point to a number of factors 
that need to be taken into account in determining what mix of policies to deploy including the 
macroeconomic, fiscal and policy stance of countries and their dynamics. The paper also 
proposes far-reaching reforms to address the global financial crisis, which would help to put 
the global macroeconomic, fiscal and financial coordination mechanisms on a firmer footing.  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The current economic and financial crisis was driven by the reversal of the three positive 
‘shocks’ that developing countries experienced during the recent boom period: exceptional 
financing, high commodity prices and, for a significant number of countries, large flows of 
remittances. The initial trigger that contributed to the reversals of these trends was the impact 
of the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble. However, it was the reversal in commodity prices  
in mid-2008 and, particularly, the severe world financial crisis that started in September 2008 
that led to significant reversal of favorable global conditions for developing countries.  
The emerging recession in the United States and other developed countries further  
multiplied the negative impact of the crisis for developing countries. 
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TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS 
One of the key channels for transmission of the crisis from developed to developing countries 
has been via private capital flows though the impact of this has been more severe for emerging 
markets than for low-income countries, which are less integrated into international private 
capital markets. In several countries, there has been a massive reversal of currency positions 
out of high-yielding assets in emerging economies into developed countries’ currency  
with a negative impact on the exchange rates of developing countries, even in countries with 
significant current account surpluses. While FDI flows have not been significantly affected to 
date, with the decline in commodity prices, FDI flows into those sectors will likely fall sharply. 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is estimated at $104 billion in 2007. A key challenge is 
for aid flows to augment at the very least according to existing commitments, though if the 
recession in the developed countries is very serious, there is a risk that aid budgets may not 
increase enough or could even fall, with negative effects on poor countries and poor peoples.   
The main channel of transmission of the crisis to exporters of manufactures and services is 
through a decline in trade volumes; while exporters of primary goods have been more affected 
by declining prices.  Falling energy prices will benefit energy importing countries but they will 
also lead to reduced investment and economic activity in commodity-dependent developing 
countries, particularly in Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America. For these 
countries, a major opportunity ahead is to redesign their trade strategy to reduce their 
commodity dependence. 
NATIONAL RESPONSES 
Countries with stabilization funds (generally, energy exporters and some metal exporters) 
 will be able to use past savings to cushion the effect of commodity price downswings. Broadly, 
national responses should aim to mitigate the contractionary effects coming from abroad and 
to rethink their trade strategies. The nature of the policy packages to be adopted will vary.  
For those countries with a strong debt and foreign exchange reserve position but weak fiscal 
stance the room for maneuver lies more in monetary than with fiscal policy. Most emerging 
economies have the capacity to avoid the traditional pro-cyclical monetary policies of past 
crises and follow the expansionary policy trajectories of industrial economies.  In the fiscal area, 
there is significant room to maneuver in a relatively large group of developing countries.  
They should use this space to mitigate the effects of the external shock. Infrastructure 
investment and social spending should be the focus of these programs.  
The strategy will also depend on each country’s social policy framework. Universal social 
policies in the areas of nutrition, basic education and health should be the major policy focus, 
but targeted programs for the poor, such as conditional cash transfers, make sense in middle-
income countries (in poorer countries, by definition, poverty is widespread and universal 
programs are clearly superior). Special emergency employment programs should be the 
essential complement, since unemployment insurance, the traditional automatic stabilizer of 
industrial countries is generally absent in developing countries. Tax reduction policies are 
unlikely to have the best effects. Trade policy can play a role in the recovery in at least three 
different ways: i) non-traditional exports can be encouraged through a mix of exchange  
rate depreciation and sectoral incentives; ii) strengthening domestic linkages of existing 
manufacturing export activities can also play a role; and iii) more active South-South Working Paper  3 
 
 
cooperation may encourage trade through existing integration processes. Payments 
agreements among central banks can also play a role in facilitating such trade without  
the need for hard currencies. 
GLOBAL RESPONSES  
The magnitude of the current crisis is clearly associated with inadequate regulation and 
supervision of banks and financial markets. The new regulatory governance needs to be  
based on a well-functioning network of national and regional authorities and include truly 
international supervision of financial institutions with a global reach. The institutional structure 
that responds to this challenge should have adequate representation from developing 
countries to ensure not just greater legitimacy, but also greater efficiency. There are a number 
of broad principles on which future financial regulation needs to be built:  the first is counter-
cyclicality, in order to correct the main market failure of banking and financial markets– their 
boom-bust nature. The second key principle for modern, effective regulation should be 
comprehensiveness; for regulation to be effective, the domain of the regulator has to  
be the same as the domain of the market to be regulated. 
The global recession now under way calls for a coordinated policy response. It means 
expansionary monetary, credit and fiscal policies in all industrial countries. Developing 
countries should adopt equally expansionary policies, individually and in a coordinated way. 
Countries that have accumulated large amounts of foreign exchange reserves and have limited 
external debt ratios do have a larger room for maneuver to adopt these policies. For others it is 
essential to avoid the IMF conditionalities of the past, which forced developing countries to 
adopt contractionary macroeconomic policies.  
Four essential reforms of the IMF should be part of the reform agenda:  i) the creation of 
a meaningful and truly global reserve currency, ii) the need to place the IMF at the center  
of global macroeconomic policy coordination giving greater voice to developing countries;  
iii) the need for the IMF to lend during balance of payments crises rapidly, at sufficient scale, 
and without overburdening borrowers with conditionalities of the past, particularly when 
the sources of the crisis are exogenous. 
REGIONAL RESPONSES FUNDED BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
In all of the areas of reform, the IMF should collaborate more closely with regional institutions, 
such as the Chiang Mai1 Initiative or the Latin American Reserve Fund.2  Developing countries 
are also in an excellent position to contribute to this task, given their large foreign exchange 
reserves. Additionally, many developing countries have created sovereign wealth funds with 
an additional level of assets of more than $3 trillion. Further, swap arrangements among 
central banks, pooling them in reserve funds or for support of the development of regional 
bond markets, are mechanisms to multiply the room to maneuver that they provide.  
While multilateral development banks should maintain their central function in the 
international development architecture, regional and sub-regional financial institutions  
owned by developing countries should play an important complementary role. If developing 
countries allocate even 1per cent of their foreign exchange reserves they could create or 
expand existing regional institutions by $50 billion at current levels of reserves, laying the basis 
to meet their development goals more efficiently.     4  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
In 2003-2007, the developing world experienced an impressive economic boom, growing  
at a rate of 7per cent per year. The boom was fueled by a mix of four ingredients prevailing in 
global markets: exceptional financing, high commodity prices and, for a significant number  
of countries, large flows of remittances. The first two conditions had coincided for the last  
time in the 1970s, while the mix of the three had never been experienced before. The rise of an 
alternative Asian engine, with China at the center, is a fourth element, which has had a strong 
influence on world trade and commodity prices. 
These conditions have been replaced since mid-2008, particularly since September 2008, 
by the effects of financial turmoil that erupted in mid-2007 in the U.S. which has now become 
the worst global financial crisis and the worst recession since the Great Depression. For a year 
since the crisis erupted, commodity prices continued to boom. This factor, together with high 
foreign exchange reserves, helped to attract capital to emerging markets even after the 
outburst of the subprime crisis. However, both have now joined the downturn. There are  
signs that remittances, the third source of the boom, have experienced a significant slowdown 
or are even falling. We will see in the immediate future whether the Asian and particularly the 
Chinese growth engine can serve as the basis for world economic growth, but recent data for 
the fourth quarter of 2008 are not very promising in this regard. More broadly, these events 
indicate that the view espoused by the IMF in 2007 that the developing world would “de-
couple” from weak economic conditions in industrial countries was essentially flawed. 
2  CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION OF THE CRISIS   
The crisis can be seen as being driven by the reversal of the three positive shocks that 
developing countries experienced during the recent boom: rapid growth of remittances, 
capital flows and trade. We start with a short look at remittances, where the information  
is not abundant. Then we deal more extensively with capital flows and trade. 
2.1  REMITTANCES 
For some regions, there is strong evidence of reduced dynamism of remittances. In the case of 
Latin America, in particular, remittances grew very slowly both in 2007 and 2008, falling as a 
proportion of GDP in both years, in sharp contrast with the rapid growth earlier in the decade. 
The direct sensitivity of migrant incomes to construction activity, which has been falling for 
three years now, seems to be an important explanation for the absolute reduction of 
remittances from the U.S. to Mexico in 2008, but absolute reductions are still an exception. 
Remittances from Europe may be experiencing a similar pattern of either a strong reduction  
in the growth rate or absolute reduction (see, for example, the case of Spain, one of the 
economies hit the hardest by a construction crisis). 
In contrast, other areas of destinations of migrants, particularly the Gulf countries, 
continued to boom until the third quarter of 2008, and have experienced no significant 
slowdown in remittances yet. This effect seems to have prevailed so far, but is likely to change 
as a result of the steep fall in oil prices. Overall, the World Bank has estimated that remittances 
to the developing world experienced a lower, but still positive and fairly strong growth in 2008 Working Paper  5 
 
 
(7per cent in 2008 vs. 16per cent in 2007). However, in 2009 they will face a reduction – either 
small (-1per cent) or large (-6per cent) (Ratha et al., 2008).  
Overall, remittances are likely to show resilience and are, therefore, unlikely to be a major 
channel of transmission of the crisis. However, should the recession become deep and 
prolonged, the effects on remittances could deepen. 
2.2  CAPITAL FLOWS 
In contrast, one of the key channels for transmission of the crisis from developed to developing 
countries is via private capital flows. The effects take place both through volumes and 
associated costs of such flows. Vulnerability of developing countries to rapid deterioration in 
capital flows has been diminished by the fact that, as a result of their good policies, many of 
these countries have far higher levels of foreign exchange reserves and lower levels of external 
debt than in the past. As we will see below, they can help to cushion countries from a 
deteriorating international environment, but the space it provides for counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies remains to be seen. Emerging market investors (both public and 
private) have also become an important source of capital flows to developing countries.  
We return to this issue below, in our policy section. 
At the same time, new sources of vulnerability have opened up, such as the volatility  
of portfolio investments made into the growing domestic capital markets of developing 
countries and the rapid unwinding of carry trade3 (this trade was mainly done using 
instruments from the rapidly growing derivative markets). Also, increased foreign ownership  
of developing country banks has not proven to be a source of strength, and in some cases  
may turned out to be a source of fragility, as these banks have withdrawn lending to their 
subsidiaries in developing and transition countries in order to strengthen their very weak 
positions in developed countries. 
As regards volumes of flows, foreign direct investment continued to grow through  
2008. Private financial flows peaked from mid-2006 to mid-2007. After a short weakening 
during the third quarter of 2007 due to the sub-prime crisis, they recovered and boomed  
again during the first semester of 2008 but dropped very sharply since the third quarter of 
2008 and became negative in some cases during the last quarter of the year. Emissions in bond 
markets came to a halt, bank lending was severely hit, and there was a sharp reversal of flows 
from mutual funds and an unwinding of the carry trade (further details below). On annual 
terms, financial flows peaked in 2007 and fell in 2008. They are widely expected (e.g. by the 



































A second source of problems is the high level of aggregate amortizations due by private 
sector borrowers, which are projected to reach $130 billion in the first half of 2009 and $250 
billion for the whole of 2009, if both loans and syndicated bonds are added. More significantly, 
some emerging countries greatly increased their short-term borrowing in 2007 and 2008, 
which seems to leave them very vulnerable to a reversal of these short-term flows. South Korea 
and Russia had particularly large short-term inflows, and their reversal has been a source of 
serious problem for their economies. 
The other category of highly problematic capital flows is net flows from non-bank sources 
such as mutual and hedge funds. Withdrawals from mutual funds in industrial countries and 
the unwinding of carry trade since July 2008 led to a massive reversal of currency positions  
out of high-yielding assets in emerging economies into developed countries’ currency.  
This phenomenon has had a major negative impact on exchange rates of developing 
countries, even in countries with significant current account surpluses. It also shows how  
some categories of private firms are almost totally driven by internationally-determined 
factors, such as the global risk aversion, and far less by the economic fundamentals of countries. 
The IIF estimates that short-term speculative carry trade positions are much reduced  
(in contrast to bank exposures that remain substantial) and, for this reason, it projects non-
bank private debt flows to rebound in 2009. However, the transparency of these positions  
and firms is quite limited, as most of these transactions do not operate over the exchanges and 
have no or limited reporting requirements (see, for example, Griffith-Jones and Dodd, 2008). Working Paper  7 
 
 
Foreign direct investment flows have been relatively more stable. However, the most 
recent UNCTAD Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2008) estimates that FDI to emerging markets 
declined by 10per cent in 2008, whilst the OECD estimates a far sharper decline. The decline in 
real estate and, especially, commodity prices seem to make it more likely that FDI flows into 
those sectors will fall sharply. This could have particularly strong negative impacts on FDI to 
Latin America and Africa. 
Official capital flows show a very different pattern. Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
increased since the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development, from $57 billion in 
2002 to a peak of $107 billion in 2005 (including debt relief), but slightly declined since then, to 
an estimated $104 billion in 2007. A key challenge is for aid flows to augment at the very least 
according to existing commitments, and there is a strong argument to increase them further. 
This is especially necessary given that poor developing countries will be hit by a number of 
external shocks related to the crisis, which will endanger their growth and their ability to meet 
poverty reduction targets. Nevertheless, if the recession in the developed countries is very 
serious, there is a risk that aid budgets may not increase enough or could even fall, with 
negative effects on poor countries and poor peoples. 
Other forms of official capital flows stand in open contrast to this trend in ODA. First, some 
developing countries with active sovereign wealth funds and/or public sector firms have been 
actively investing abroad. This has led to net negative official flows to developing countries. 
This is particularly true of the oil-exporting countries of Western Asia. Second, an even larger 
negative flow is associated with foreign exchange reserve accumulation, which is generally 
reflected in investments in safe assets from reserve currency countries. And third, in recent 
years major multilateral development banks have experienced difficulties in finding a demand 
for their lending, and some countries have actually paid back some of their debts to these 
institutions. The crisis has generated a large demand for these flows, reflecting the counter-
cyclical role that this type of financing should have. However, the magnitudes involved  
are relatively small, in the order of billions rather than the tens and hundreds billions that 
characterize net changes in private sector financing. This gap indicates the need for much 
larger official funds that those currently available. 
2.3  TRADE 
In recent decades, world trade has shown two important characteristics. First of all, it has 
tended to expand more rapidly than world production, a process that has been accompanied 
by a rapid diversification in the trade structure. Thus, during the recent boom, in 2003-2006, 
world trade grew at an annual rate of 9.3per cent, more than twice the rate of growth of world 
output (3.8per cent). Second, these rates of growth have been highly elastic to world output 
through the business cycle and have, therefore, been more volatile than world production.  
A major implication of this characteristic is that, although trade enhances world business cycle 
upswings, it equally tends to multiply downswings. Trade volumes contracted in 2001 and will 
again contract in 2009. The growth of trade volume experienced a strong slowdown since mid-
2007, to a rate of around 2per cent by September 2008. This rate turned negative in November 
and December if we are to judge from reports that indicate that even China, the most dynamic 
world exporter, experienced negative export growth and even sharper negative import growth 
in those months. 8  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
While this recession in trade volumes will be the main channel of transmission of the  
crisis to exporters of manufactures and services (tourism being a major service export for many 
developing countries), price developments will dominate the export performance of exporters 
of primary goods. 
In recent years, the world economy experienced the most impressive commodity boom  
in more than a century, both in terms of duration (five years), intensity and product coverage 
(World Bank, 2009, chapter 2). The boom was more pronounced for minerals, including oil and 
other energy products, than for agricultural goods. This is reflected in the fact that whereas at 
the peak around the second quarter of 2008 the real prices of minerals exceeded the average 
of the 1970s by considerable margins (more in the case of energy products but also 
significantly in the case of metals), real agricultural prices went only briefly back to the level of 
the 1970s. It was, in other words, a boom of mineral, not agricultural prices (Ocampo and Parra, 
2008). A major reflection of this fact is that, whereas the terms of trade of mineral exporting 
countries improved significantly, those of agricultural exporters remained flat and those of 
manufacturing exporters deteriorated (United Nations, 2009, Figure II.6).  
This difference seems to reflect diverse determinants behind the associated price  
trends among commodity groups. For mineral exports, the dominant issue has been the 
underinvestment generated by a long period of low prices over the last two decades of  
the twentieth century. Given the higher demand propelled by rapid growth in the developing 
world and specifically, the high demand of China for metals, prices boomed. Investment 
increased, but there were significant lags in the transformation of new projects into increased 
supplies. In the case of agriculture, the disproportion between supply and demand was more 
moderate, though the growing demand for biofuels operated as a major mechanism of 
transmission of high energy prices into higher agricultural prices, particularly during the second 
semester of 2007 and the first semester of 2008 - the last phase of the commodity price boom.6 
Additional factors affecting commodity prices during the latest phase of the boom were 
dollar exchange rate volatility and financial speculation. These factors resulted in an 
unprecedented level of price volatility. The turnaround of price trends took place since July for 
most commodities and since August for energy products and therefore preceded the financial 
collapse of mid-September. But the worldwide credit freeze that followed led to a free fall for 
most commodities. Energy products and metals, which had experienced the most impressive 



















3  POLICY RESPONSES 
3.1  NATIONAL RESPONSES  
Given the fact that there has been a worldwide trend towards external opening in recent 
decades, the ongoing crisis will have severe effects on developing countries. As indicated, 
remittances will show some resilience. Financial turmoil will have stronger effects on middle 
income countries more integrated into world financial markets, whereas low-income countries 
dependent on official flows will remain less affected by the capital flows channel. Given the 
magnitude of the collapse of commodity prices, the trade channel will affect all countries,  
but is likely to affect commodity-dependent economies more, many of which are low income 
countries. Countries with stabilization funds (generally, energy exporters and some metal 
exporters) will be able to use past savings to cushion the effect of commodity price downswings. 
National responses should aim to mitigate the contractionary effects coming from abroad 
and to rethink their trade strategies. The room for maneuver to adopt expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies will depend on balance of payments constraints. In the case of fiscal policy, 
it also depends on recent fiscal stances, inherited public sector debts and the existence (or the 
absence) of well-developed domestic bond markets where the public sector can finance its 
current imbalances in non-inflationary ways. Given the dependence on balance of payments 
constraints, the availability of external financing will be critical. 
The enclosed table summarizes the evolution of three major external variables during the 
recent boom – the current account balance, external debt and foreign exchange reserves – in 
90 developing and transition economies,7 each with a population of over 5 million as of 2007. 
The table shows the simple averages of ratios of these variables to GDP for each region, as well 
as the proportion of countries showing improvement in the indicator over the boom. 
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Africa  31  -5.6  -4.2  87%  45%  89.7  43.0  97%  12.8  18.1  78% 
Central and 
Eastern Europe  8  -5.4  -9.1  100%  38%  56.4  57.3  57%  21.0  23.2  63% 
CIS  8  -1.0  3.1  63%  25%  56.1  44.5  88%  12.9  21.3  100% 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  16  -0.7  -0.9  50%  38%  63.7  37.6  100%  11.7  14.8  69% 
Middle East 
incl.Egypt  7  7.2  6.5  43%  43%  54.0  28.6  100%  41.1  50.1  40% 
Asia, incl. NICs  20  2.2  3.0  30%  45%  52.6  36.9  100%  27.2  32.7  69% 
Total  90      63%  41%      94%      72% 
Source:  Own estimates based on IMF, International Financial Statistics. 10  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
The dominant pattern over this period was an increasing number of countries with 
current account (and indeed larger size) deficits. This trend was matched, however, by broad-
based and, in many cases, large improvements in debt ratios and, to a lesser extent, by foreign 
exchange reserve accumulation. Debt improvements were associated both with domestic 
policies and with the major debt relief initiatives for low-income countries (the Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative and a major debt relief granted individually by the Paris Club). Foreign 
exchange reserve accumulation underestimates the magnitude of the improvement, as it does 
not include fiscal funds held abroad by either sovereign wealth or stabilization funds. 
In regional terms, the Middle East, Asia and the CIS show the best performance in the 
three dimensions (less so in the case of debt in the CIS). Africa shows large current account 
deficits but significant improvements in the two other dimensions. Latin America and the 
Caribbean stands out for its avoidance of current account deficits and large improvements  
in debt ratios. Central and Eastern Europe shows the weakest stance: large current account 
deficits with limited or no improvements in debt and foreign exchange reserves. 
Unfortunately, no equivalent picture can be drawn for fiscal indicators. However, for those 
countries for which data are available, weak fiscal positions are generally infrequent. Again, 
Central and Eastern Europe and major South Asian countries stand out as having the weakest 
positions, but there are individual countries with large central government deficits mixed with 
high levels of public sector debt in other regions as well, such as Colombia and El Salvador in 
Latin America, and Egypt and Jordan in the Middle East. 
The picture, therefore, is one in which developing countries do have larger room for 
maneuver to adopt counter-cyclical policies than in the past. The major regional exception is 
Central and Eastern Europe, where the traditional mix prevails of weak external and fiscal 
indicators that has led to frequent macroeconomic crises. That mix is infrequent elsewhere, 
though there are two notable cases in South Asia (Pakistan and Sri Lanka). These countries  
will have to undergo some traditional macroeconomic adjustment. It is essential, however, that 
in these cases the fiscal adjustment is done in such a way as to avoid the worst of pro-cyclical 
fiscal adjustments of the past, and is able in particular to maintain good levels of public sector 
spending in the social sector and in infrastructure. In the past, fiscal reform packages that focus 
on strengthening government revenues have shown to be preferable to sharp spending 
reduction packages. 
The nature of the policy packages to be adopted depends on the countries’ current 
stance. For those countries with a strong debt and foreign exchange reserve position but 
relatively weak fiscal stance (India and Colombia are two important examples), the room for 
maneuver lies more in monetary than with fiscal policy. More generally, most emerging 
economies have the capacity to avoid the traditional pro-cyclical monetary policies of past 
crises and follow the expansionary policy trajectories of industrial economies. Most have 
actually adopted policies to ease domestic financing, to facilitate access of private sector 
companies to foreign exchange and, to a lesser extent, to reduce domestic interest rates.  
They should continue to move in that direction. A similar rule of easing monetary policy  
should be followed by other developing countries. 
In the fiscal area, there is significant room to maneuver in a relatively large group of 
developing countries. They should use this space to mitigate the effects of the external  
shock. Infrastructure investment and social spending should be the focus of these programs. 
The strategy will depend on each country’s social policy framework. Universal social policies  
in the areas of nutrition, basic education and health should be the major policy focus, but Working Paper  11 
 
 
targeted programs for the poor, such as conditional cash transfers, make sense in middle-
income countries (in poorer countries, by definition, poverty is widespread and universal 
programs are clearly superior). Special emergency employment programs should be the 
essential complement, since unemployment insurance, the traditional automatic stabilizer  
of industrial countries is generally absent in developing countries. Within the available mix of 
policies, experience indicates that tax reduction policies are unlikely to have the best effects 
and, rather, strengthening the tax base should be the focus of policy makers.   
Although trade opportunities are not generally viable, trade policy can play a role in the 
recovery in at least three different ways. First, non-traditional exports can be encouraged, 
particularly in commodity-dependent economies, through a mix of exchange rate depreciation 
and sectoral incentives. Second, the possibility of strengthening domestic linkages of existing 
manufacturing export activities can also play a role. Third, more active South-South 
cooperation can play a role, by encouraging trade through existing integration processes. 
Payments agreements among central banks can also play a role in facilitating such trade 
without the need for hard currencies. 
Finally, and very importantly, the crisis provides an opportunity to rethink the role of 
domestic markets, which were largely left out from the radar of policy makers during the 
reform period. Indeed, a major implication of expansionary macroeconomic policies is that  
all countries can contribute to the global economic recovery by focusing on their domestic 
demand. Protection policies would be clearly counter-productive, generating beggar-thy-
neighbor effects. But policies that focus on the mass market for consumer goods and on 
strengthening small- and medium-sized enterprises, which tend to depend heavily on local 
markets, can play a role in policy packages that place domestic demand again at the center  
of economic policy. 
3.2  GLOBAL RESPONSES 
Given all the channels through which financial contagion spreads across the world, the present 
financial crisis has shown again how dysfunctional the current international financial architecture 
is. Whereas previous crises have demonstrated the deficiencies of this architecture for managing 
the financial vulnerability of developing countries, the current crisis has made patently clear the 
major financial regulatory deficit that characterizes the global system. Unfortunately, although 
deep flaws were identified during previous crises in developing countries there was little 
progress on any significant reform of the international financial architecture (Griffith-Jones and 
Ocampo, 2003). The fact that this time the crisis started in developed countries provides a hope 
for action though also the risk that action would focus on industrial rather than developing 
countries. Within the G-20, the call by several countries to engage in a serious reform and the 
prospects of the Commission of Experts of Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial 
System convened by the President of the UNGA are most commendable.  
3.2.1  Correcting the Regulatory Deficit of Global Finance 
The magnitude of the current crisis is clearly associated with inadequate regulation and 
supervision of banks and financial markets. Since the Asian crisis, it became widely accepted 
that financial liberalization must be accompanied by stronger prudential regulation and 
supervision. This lesson was applied in many parts of the developing world but, paradoxically, 12  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
was largely ignored in the United States and the United Kingdom, where liberalization was 
accompanied by deregulation and weak supervision of financial intermediation (Stiglitz, 2008). 
The new regulatory governance should be based on a well-functioning network of 
national and regional authorities and include truly international supervision of financial 
institutions with a global reach. 
First of all, the institutional structure that responds to this challenge should have 
adequate representation from developing countries. This arrangement will ensure not just 
greater legitimacy, but also greater efficiency, given the growing role of developing countries 
in the global economy. Secondly, it should have real power to influence decisions of national 
regulators, especially in the largest countries, including industrial countries. Thirdly, it should 
take macro-prudential concerns clearly into account. Finally, it should consider the potential 
costs of financial instability on the real economy. For this purpose, it could include 
representation not just from different financial regulatory bodies across sectors and countries, 
but also from those concerned with growth and equity. For that reason, the United Nations 
should have a place in the new institutional structure. 
The current deep crisis and numerous previous ones that hit developing countries seem 
to demonstrate that crises are inevitable in deregulated financial systems.  There is, therefore, 
ever-growing consensus that more complete and more effective financial regulation is 
required. Its main objective must be to help avoid future build-up of systemic risk.  
There are two broad principles on which future financial regulation needs to be built 
(D’Arista and Griffith-Jones, 2008). The first is counter-cyclicality, in order to correct the main 
market failure of banking and financial markets - their boom-bust nature. The key idea is that 
provisions and/or capital required should increase as risks are incurred, that is, when loans are 
disbursed. In this way, provisions and capital requirements should increase during periods  
of rapid credit growth and decrease when lending expands at slower rates (Ocampo, 2003).  
This would strengthen banks in boom times and discourage them then from excessive lending. 
It would also make it easier for them to continue lending in difficult times. 
The second key principle for modern, effective regulation should be comprehensiveness. 
Economic theory tells us that for regulation to be effective, the domain of the regulator has to 
be the same as the domain of the market to be regulated. There is need for comprehensive 
and equivalent transparency, as well as regulation of all financial activities, instruments, and 
actors. Both minimum liquidity and solvency requirements need to be regulated. Indeed, if 
banks had stronger liquidity, as in the past, their solvency problems could have been smaller  
in the current crisis.  
Developing countries need to make sure that new regulatory standards allow enough 
flexibility, so they can be adapted to their needs and characteristics. Also developing countries 
should advocate for regulatory changes in developed countries (e.g., derivatives markets)  
to ensure their economies will not be harmed by disruptions caused elsewhere. 
3.2.2  IMF Reform 
Four essential reforms of the IMF should be part of the reform agenda (see South Centre, 2008). 
The first long-term reform is the creation of a meaningful and truly global reserve currency, Working Paper  13 
 
 
which could be based on the IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). This currency would 
overcome both the inequities but also the instability that are inherent in a global reserve 
system based on a national, or a few national currencies (Ocampo, 2007-8). SDRs can also be 
used to provide counter-cyclical official liquidity to developing countries. 
The second issue is the need to place the IMF at the center of global macroeconomic 
policy coordination. This is the only way to give developing countries a voice on the issue.  
The third, particularly urgent issue is the need for the IMF to lend during balance of 
payments crises rapidly, at sufficient scale, and without overburdening borrowers with the 
conditionalities of the past, particularly when the sources of the crisis are exogenous, such as a 
rapid reversal of capital flows and/or a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade. The recent 
approval (October 2008) of a fairly large and rapidly-disbursing facility by the IMF seems 
positive. The new Short-Term Liquidity Facility (SLF) is a quick-disbursing financing mechanism 
for countries with strong economic policies, which are yet facing temporary liquidity issues.  
To qualify for a loan under the SLF, countries must have sound macroeconomic policies and 
sustainable debt burdens. Additionally, the last annual country assessment by the IMF must 
have been positive. The IMF stated that “Given this strong emphasis on past performance, 
financing is made available without standard phasing, performance criteria, monitoring, and 
other conditionality of a Fund arrangement.” Countries will be allowed to borrow up to  
500per cent of their quota.  
The U.S. Federal Reserve simultaneously announced the establishment of temporary swap 
lines with the Central Banks of Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Singapore.   
The IMF SLF plans to keep the results of countries rejected confidential, as to not increase 
market instability in rejected countries. However there is a concern that the SLF is “essentially 
dividing developing countries into an A-list of nations that qualify for loans without strings, 
and a B-list of everyone else.” As Kemal Derviş, UNDP Administrator (Washington Post, 
November 2, 2008) put it: “Emerging markets cannot be easily and simply divided into two 
categories: those with good and those with bad policies.” It would seem far better to enlarge 
access to SLF to a fairly large number of countries with reasonably good policies 
(Bhatttacharya, Derviş and Ocampo, 2008).  
There should also be a major and quick reform and more active use of compensatory 
financing to reduce the large cost of adjustment for developing countries hit by exogenous 
shocks linked to their terms of trade. Compensatory financing has become urgent, given the 
sharp fall in commodity prices, with highly negative effects. The IMF Compensatory Financing 
Facility has not been used since 2000 due to very tight conditionalities. For low-income 
countries, the enhancement of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PGRF) to 
compensate for the adverse terms of trade shocks, and the Exogenous Shocks Facility 
(compensatory financing without a PRGF) are clearly insufficient, especially as regards the scale 
of the lending. An expansion of this facility is urgent, given the severity of the current crisis and 
the potential damage it could do to low-income countries’ growth and poverty reduction, 
which could set them back for meeting the MDGs. Especially in the light of recent sharp falls  
in commodity prices, the following broad suggestions for compensatory financing seem 
especially relevant (see, for more details, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2008): 14  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
i.  Scaling up: Perhaps the most important point is that the scale of existing facilities 
and the amount of resources in each facility are too small in proportion to the 
shocks. This includes resources available for grants and for the subsidies that 
allow concessional financing of loans. There should be fewer restrictions on the 
scale of facilities (e.g. higher per cent of resources that can be accessed in 













3.2.3  Coordination of Global Macroeconomic Policy for Growth  
and Poverty Reduction 
The global recession now under way calls for a coordinated policy response. It means 
expansionary monetary, credit and fiscal policies in all industrial countries. Many are now 
adopting such policies. Developing countries should also be part of the solution, and should 
adopt equally expansionary policies, individually and in a coordinated way. As we have 
pointed out above, countries that have accumulated large amounts of foreign exchange 
reserves and have limited external debt ratios do have a larger room for maneuver to adopt 
these policies, compared with previous crises. For those who do not have this policy space, it is 
essential to avoid the IMF conditionalities of the past, which forced developing countries to 
adopt contractionary macroeconomic policies. It is important to make available sufficiently 
large-scale and rapidly disbursing IMF facilities.  
Some large developing countries can actually have a strong influence on world economic 
activity. Given its size, large reserves and strong fiscal position, China plays a particularly crucial 
role in this regard. China needs to boost its domestic demand significantly, along the lines 
announced in late 2008,8 and increase financial support to other developing countries, which 
will benefit both China and the world economy. 
A large increase in official development assistance to low income countries can play an 
important role for both combating poverty and contributing to the generation of aggregate 
demand at the global level. Additional ODA and highly concessional lending with low 
conditionality (e.g., from World Bank’s IDA) is particularly important to avoid contractionary 
policies in the poor countries suffering a deterioration of their terms of trade due to the 
collapse of commodity prices or other external shocks. This will significantly help poor 
countries to avoid setbacks in their aim to meet MDGs. Working Paper  15 
 
 
Past crises have also shown that multilateral development banks can play an essential role 
as lenders when private financing dries up. One particularly problematic issue during crises in 
developing countries is the curtailment of commercial credit available to exporters, limiting an 
essential mechanism through which countries can recover from crises. So, the launching by 
multilateral and/or regional development banks of a large program of commercial lending 
and/or guarantees should be at the center of the crisis response efforts. No conditionalities 
should be attached. To substitute for the sharp reduction in private flows, these banks should 
expand lending rapidly. Unfortunately, as pointed out in our diagnosis, the scale of official 
lending is small relative to the magnitude of contraction of private flows. Scaling up the size  
of MDBs may, therefore, become essential if the credit freeze persists. 
3.2.4  Regional Responses Funded by Developing Countries 
In all of the areas of reform, the IMF should collaborate more closely with regional institutions, 
such as the Chiang Mai Initiative or the Latin American Reserve Fund. 
Developing countries are in an excellent position to contribute to this task, given their 
large foreign exchange reserves and their ability to use those reserves more actively. In mid-
2008, developing countries as a whole had a level of reserves approaching $5 trillion. 
Additionally, many developing countries have created sovereign wealth funds, which have 
an additional level of assets of more than $3 trillion. Swap arrangements among central 
banks, pooling them in reserve funds or to support the development of regional bond 
markets, are mechanisms to multiply the room to maneuver that they provide. These 
reserves and existing sovereign wealth funds could also be used to increase the role of 
regional development banks owned by developing countries, by investing in the capital  
of existing institutions and creating new ones. 
Multilateral development banks should maintain their central function in the international 
development architecture and, in particular, in financing human development, infrastructure 
and clean energy investment. But regional and sub-regional financial institutions owned by 
developing countries should play an important complementary role, as they give a greater 
voice and sense of ownership to developing countries. Moreover, regional and sub-regional 
development banks are particularly suited to provide regional public goods.  
If developing countries allocate 1per cent of their foreign exchange reserves to the paid-in 
capital of regional and sub-regional institutions, this would amount to $50 billion at current 
levels of reserves. Assuming a ratio of loans-to-capital of 2.4 times9  the expanded regional and 
sub-regional development banks could generate additional annual lending of approximately 
$120 billion. This additional lending could be very valuable in the current context. 
By expanding or creating new regional and sub-regional financial institutions, developing 
countries could lay the basis for their own current and future lending capacity, which would 
eventually help them meet their development goals. Given their large foreign-exchange 
reserves, we believe the time to begin such an initiative is now. A network of regional 
development banks is already in place, though unevenly developed in different regions of the 
developing world. The multiplication and growth of these institutions is highly desirable. 16  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
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1. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) is an initiative under the ASEAN+3  framework.  After 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
member countries started this initiative to manage regional short-term liquidity problems. 
2. The Latin American Reserve Fund, is a multilateral organization formed by the central banks from Bolivia, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
3. The phrase "carry trade" became widely popular in the context of currency speculation. The search for yield implies 
that the excess liquidity surging out of the low-interest currencies is invested into high-yielding currencies. When the 
process reverses, investors pull out high-yielding currencies, which they fear would depreciate and retreat back to the 
“safe haven” of the low-interest-rate currencies (Frankel, 2008).  
4. United Nations (2009), Chapter III. For annual figures by region, see in particular Table III.2. 
5. See the latest Capital Market Monitor of this organization in <www.iif.com>. 
6. See, on the latter, von Braun (2007). 
7. Comparable information is available for the 90 countries in the case of the current account, for 80 in the case of 
external debt and 78 for foreign exchange reserves. 
8. In November 2008 China announced a fiscal stimulus package in the amount of 585  billion U.S. dollars to be spent 
over the next two years to finance programs low-income housing, rural infrastructure, water, electricity, transportation, 
the environment, and technological innovation among other priority areas. (Note from the editor). 
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